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Abstract We present a comprehensive review of the
most effective content-based e-mail spam filtering tech-
niques. We focus primarily on Machine Learning-based
spam filters and their variants, and report on a broad
review ranging from surveying the relevant ideas, ef-
forts, effectiveness, and the current progress. The ini-
tial exposition of the background examines the basics
of e-mail spam filtering, the evolving nature of spam,
spammers playing cat-and-mouse with e-mail service
providers (ESPs), and the Machine Learning front in
fighting spam. We conclude by measuring the impact of
Machine Learning-based filters and explore the promis-
ing offshoots of latest developments.
Keywords E-mail · False positive · Image spam ·
Machine learning · Spam · Spam filtering.
1 Introduction
Electronic-mail (abbreviated as e-mail) is a fast, effec-
tive and inexpensive method of exchanging messages
over the Internet. Whether its a personal message from
a family member, a company-wide message from the
boss, researchers across continents sharing recent find-
ings, or astronauts staying in touch with their fam-
ily (via e-mail uplinks or IP phones), e-mail is a pre-
ferred means for communication. Used worldwide by
2.3 billion users, at the time of writing the article, e-
mail usage is projected to increase up to 4.3 billion ac-
counts by the year-end 2016 [Radicati, 2016]. But the
Alexy Bhowmick · Shyamanta M. Hazarika
School of Engineering,
Tezpur University
Tezpur, Assam, India.
E-mail: alexyb@tezu.ernet.in
increasing dependence on e-mail has induced the emer-
gence of many problems caused by ‘illegitimate’ e-mails,
i.e. spam. According to the Text Retrieval Conference
(TREC) the term ‘spam’ is - an unsolicited, unwanted
e-mail that was sent indiscriminately [Cormack, 2008].
Spam e-mails are unsolicited, un-ratified and usually
mass mailed. Spam being a carrier of malware causes
the proliferation of unsolicited advertisements, fraud
schemes, phishing messages, explicit content, promo-
tions of cause, etc. On an organizational front, spam
effects include: i) annoyance to individual users, ii)
less reliable e-mails, iii) loss of work productivity, iv)
misuse of network bandwidth, v) wastage of file server
storage space and computational power, vi) spread of
viruses, worms, and Trojan horses, and vii) financial
losses through phishing, Denial of Service (DoS), direc-
tory harvesting attacks, etc.[Siponen and Stucke, 2006].
Over the couple of decades e-mail spam volume has
increased exponentially and is not just an annoyance
but a security threat; as it continues to evolve in its
potential to do serious damage to individuals, busi-
nesses and economies. The fact that e-mail is a very
cheap means of reaching to millions of potential cus-
tomers serves as a strong motivation for amateur ad-
vertisers and direct marketers [Cranor and Lamacchia,
1998]. For e.g. one of the favorite spam topics is the
‘penny stock ’ spam or the pump and dump schemes
that take place over the Internet platform. Fraudsters
(spammers) purchase large quantities of ‘penny stocks’
i.e. stocks of small, thinly traded companies, through
compromised brokerage accounts and promote them via
message boards or abroad e-mail campaign, pointing to
the transient increase in share value. Even if a frac-
tion of the recipients are fooled into buying the stocks,
the spammers make a huge profit. Unwitting investors
seeking higher gains believe the hype and purchase the
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stocks, creating higher demand and raising the price
further. Soon after the spam e-mails are sent, the fraud-
ster sells off his stocks at premium leaving the duped in-
vestors desperate to sell their own. Stock spam is just an
old trick that has made a massive comeback in the first
half of 2013. The Security Threat Report 2014 [Sophos,
2014] suggests that on some days, 50% of the overall
spam volume were ‘pump and dump’ mailings.
According to recent reports [IBM, 2014], [Cyberoam,
2014], [Symantec, 2014], spam is being increasingly used
to distribute viruses, malware, links to phishing sites,
etc. An average of 54 billion spam e-mails was sent
worldwide each day [Cyberoam, 2014]. Sizeable chunks
were that of pharmacy spam, dating spam, online prod-
uct purchase, diet products and online casinos spam
[CISCO, 2014]. Another kind of spam that is rapidly
evolving is ‘Political spam’; e-mail, contrary to popular
media such as print, radio, or television provides polit-
ical contestants an economical medium to get through
to broad constituents of the electorate. Political spam
is but a campaign tactic that mostly involves marketing
for political ends or mudslinging.
Spam is a broad concept that is still not completely
understood. In general, spam has many forms - chat
rooms are subject to chat spam, blogs are subject to
blog spam (splogs)[Kolari et al, 2006], search engines
are often misled by web spam (search engine spamming
or spamdexing)[Gyongyi and Garcia-molina, 2005], [Shi
and Xie, 2013], while social systems are plagued by so-
cial spam [Lee et al, 2010a]. This paper focuses on ‘e-
mail spam’ and its variants, and not ‘spam’ in general.
Prior attempts to review e-mail spam filtering using
Machine Learning have been made, the most notable
ones being [Androutsopoulos et al, 2006], [Carpinter
and Hunt, 2006], [Blanzieri and Bryl, 2008], [Cormack,
2008], [Guzella and Caminhas, 2009], and Wang et al
[2013]. We extend earlier surveys by taking an updated
set of works into account. We consider e-mail header
analysis and analysis of non-content features, which
were not discussed in the fairly recent overviews by
[Guzella and Caminhas, 2009] and [Wang et al, 2013],
who have performed topic modeling instead. We also
present a content analysis of the major spam-filtering
surveys over the period (2004-2015). Significant amounts
of historical and recent literature, including gray litera-
ture (dissertations, press articles, technical and security
reports, web publications, etc.) were studied to report
recent advances and findings. We believe our survey is
of complementary nature and provides an inclusive sur-
vey of the state-of-the-art in content-based e-mail spam
filtering.
Our work addresses the following:
Fig. 1 The e-mail architecture.
– First, we perform an extensive evolutionary explo-
ration of the major spam characteristics, trends and
spammers evasion techniques. In doing so, we under-
line some promising research directions and a few
research gaps.
– Second, we discuss feature engineering for textual
and image spam e-mails. We investigate alternate
spam filtering plans based on e-mail header and non-
content features.
– Third, we present taxonomy of content-based e-mail
spam filtering and a qualitative summary of ma-
jor surveys on spam e-mails over the period (2004-
2015).
– Fourth, we report new findings and suggest lines
of future investigations into machine learning tech-
niques for emerging spam types.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Sec
2, we characterize spam evolution, trends, spam causes
and their counter measures. In Sec 3, we discuss corpus
pre-processing, feature extraction, feature selection and
analysis of header and non-content features. In Sec 4,
we review spam filtering techniques employed prior to
Machine Learning. Section 5 offers details on Machine
Learning algorithms applied successfully to textual and
multimedia content of spam e-mails. Special attention
is given to recent techniques. Section 6 overviews stan-
dard evaluation measures and publicly available e-mail
spam, image spam and phishing e-mail corpuses. Fi-
nally, Section 7 outlines future research trends.
1.1 E-mail and Spam Filters
When an e-mail is sent, it enters into the messaging
system and is routed from one server to another till
it reaches the recipients mailbox. Figure 1 depicts the
e-mail architecture and how e-mail works. E-mail de-
pends on few primary protocols: SMTP (Simple Mail
Transfer Protocol) [Jonathan B. Postel, 1982], POP3
(Post Office Protocol) and IMAP (Internet Message
Access Protocol). The transmission details are speci-
fied by the SMTP protocol. POP3 and IMAP are the
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most widely implemented protocols for the Mail User
Agent (MUA) and are basically used to receive mes-
sages. A Message Transfer Agent (MTA) receives mails
from a sender MUA or some other MTA and then deter-
mines the appropriate route for the mail [Katakis et al,
2007]. The recipients MTA delivers the incoming mail
to the incoming mail server Mail Delivery Agent (MDA)
which is basically a POP/IMAP server. MUAs (e.g.
Mozilla Thunderbird, Microsoft Outlook, etc.) are e-
mail clients and help the user to read and write e-mails.
Spam filters can be deployed at strategic places in both
clients and servers. Many Internet Service Providers
(ISPs) and organizations deploy spam filters at the e-
mail server level, the preferred places to deploy being at
the gateways, mail routers, etc. They can be deployed
in clients, where they can be installed at proxies or as
plug-ins, as in [Irwin and Friedman, 2008]. Some spam
filters, (e.g. SpamBayes) can be deployed at both server
and client levels.
1.2 Structure of an E-mail
An e-mail comprises of two elements: body and the
header. The e-mail body comprises of unstructured data
such as text, HTML markup, multimedia objects and
attachments. The header comprises trace information
and structured fields that are part of the message con-
tent. The Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) [Jonathan
B. Postel, 1982] defines e-mail header session to contain
fields like - the subject, senders name, e-mail ID, send-
ing date, routing information, timestamp, etc. for recip-
ient information and successful delivery. Each attribute
(field) in the header has a name and specific meaning -
– Received: Contains transit-related information of
e-mail servers, IP addresses, dates, etc.
– From: Sender’s name; e-mail ID. “Name”
<e-mail@example.com>
– To: Recipient’s name; e-mail ID. “Name”
<e-mail@example.com>
– Return Path: Encloses an optional address specifi-
cation to be used if an error is encountered (bounce).
– Message ID: A single unique message identifier
designated by the mail system.
– X-mailer: The mail software used to create/send
the message.
– Subject: String identifies the theme of the message
placed by the sender.
– Content type: Format of content (character set,
etc.), specified by MIME (Multipurpose Internet Mail
Extensions).
Each e-mail message comprises of the transit-handling
envelope [Crocker, 2009] that is hidden from e-mail users.
First the envelope sender address is sent, followed by
one or more envelope recipient addresses, and finally
the actual message is sent. The e-mail servers actually
use the envelope address (not the message header ad-
dress) to deliver the e-mail to the correct recipient. The
final recipient sees only the e-mail header and body.
The envelope address is one of the e-mail features that
is very often abused by spammers.
2 Characterizing Spam Evolution
A couple of decades earlier spam e-mail content was
mainly textual. Therefore, spam filters analyzed only
the e-mail body and header to distinguish ham (le-
gitimate e-mails) from spam e-mails. Today however,
amateur advertisers and opportunists harness addresses
from chat rooms, web pages, newsgroup archives, ser-
vice provider directories etc and send junk e-mail blindly
to millions without much cost [Androutsopoulos et al,
2006]. Anti-spam software companies and research groups
working on spam filtering for quite some time now have
tasted limited success, mostly because spam filtering is
an adversarial classification task. In such tasks, a ma-
licious adversary ‘poisons’ the training data with care-
fully crafted attack techniques in order to mislead a
classifier [Jorgensen et al, 2008]. To deliver spam e-
mail to a huge number of recipients, spammers often
resort to use of bulk mailing software or e-mail har-
vesters [Blanzieri and Bryl, 2008].
Spam evolution has been briefly discussed in sci-
entific literature [Carpinter and Hunt, 2006] [Guzella
and Caminhas, 2009] [Almeida and Yamakami, 2012].
One reason why spam is difficult to filter is because
of its dynamic nature. The characteristics (e.g. topics,
frequent terms, etc) of spam e-mail vary rapidly over
time as spammers always seek to invent new strategies
to bypass spam filters. These strategies include - word
obfuscation, image spam, sending e-mail spam from hi-
jacked computers, etc. A proper understanding of the
spam nature and evolution can help much in the devel-
opment of proper countermeasures. Some of the evasion
techniques and major trends in spam causes and char-
acteristics seen over the years are discussed below:
2.1 Word Obfuscation
Words like ‘sex ’, ‘free’, ‘congratulations’ are good indi-
cators of spam and have large (‘spammy’) weights. Ini-
tial spam filters based on heuristic filtering could easily
detect and filter spam e-mails based on the presence of
such obvious words. Figure 2 illustrates a word cloud of
common words in spam e-mail [Greenberg, 2010]; the
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Fig. 2 A word cloud of common words in spam e-mail.
larger a word appears, the more often it has been found
to occur in e-mail spam). Spammers adapted quickly by
making sure such obvious words are not encountered
verbatim in their messages. To defeat filters, they re-
sorted to simple obfuscation techniques like breaking
the word into multiple pieces, as -
– f-r-e-e
embedding special characters
– fr<!--xx-->ee
using HTML comments
– \item <a href=’m&#97;i&#108;to&#58;%&#54;
6re&#101;’>free</a>
with character-entity encoding
– \item o fr&#101xe
encoded with HTML ASCII codes
When seen by any web user, all these above sam-
ples look the same as “free” but they thwart simple
word/phrase filtering and escape the filter rules. The
effectiveness of filter re-training however caused spam-
mers to abandon one technique and migrate to newer
obfuscation techniques. HTML-based obfuscation tech-
niques are discussed at length in the study by [Pu and
Webb, 2006]. Spammers resorted to the use of innocu-
ous words to obfuscate the e-mail message content in
order to confuse or circumvent spam filters. In general,
there are many ways to obscure the e-mail content:
misplaced spaces, purposeful misspellings, embedded
special characters (letter substitution), Unicode letter
transliteration [Liu and Stamm, 2007], HTML redraw-
ing, etc. Tokenization attacks are a similar spamming
technique more associated with the preprocessing stage
in spam filtering. In tokenization the spammer works
to defeat the feature selection process by splitting and
modifying the crucial message features. Examples in-
clude introducing spaces, special symbols, asterisks in
words or HTML, JavaScript, CSS layout tricks. A clas-
sic example of evading the recognition of the word ‘VI-
AGRA by the spam filter would be ‘V-I-A-G-R-A’.
2.2 Bayesian Poisoning Attacks
A usual criticism of statistical spam filters (e.g. Spam-
Bayes,DSPAM, POPFile) is that they are susceptible
to ‘poisoning ’ by interjection of random words into the
spam messages [Fawcett, 2004], [Graham-Cumming, 2006].
Bayesian poisoning is such a kind of statistical attack in
which spammers use carefully crafted e-mails to attack
the heart of a Bayesian filter and thus degrade its ef-
fectiveness. The spammers add random or carefully se-
lected legitimate-seeming words in order to confuse the
spam filter and cause it to believe an incoming spam e-
mail is not spam (a statistical II error). Spammers can
get these common English words or Ham phrases from
sources like - Reuters news articles, written and spo-
ken English, and USENET messages. These strong sta-
tistical attacks have an incidental consequence too - a
statistical I error or simply a higher false positive rate.
The reason is that when the user trains the spam filter
with the poisoned training data, the spam filter ‘learns’
about such random words as being good evidences of
spam [Sanz, 2008]. Paul Graham [Graham, 2002b] how-
ever played down the effectiveness of such poisoning
techniques arguing that to outweigh the statistical sig-
nificance of even one incriminating word as “viagra”,
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spammers would need many innocent words (e.g. names
of ones friends and family, terms used at work, etc)
which are unique for each recipient and spammers have
no way of figuring them out. However, evidence sug-
gests Bayesian poisoning is real and cannot be dismissed
[Biggio et al, 2011].
Graham-Cumming [Graham-Cumming, 2004] [Graham-
Cumming, 2006], identified two types of possible at-
tacks on Bayesian filters: passive (where in absence of
feedback, the spammer can at best make educated guesses)
and active (where the spammer discovers an effective
wordlist after getting feedback). [Lowd and Meek, 2005]
investigated ‘good word attacks’ where a spammer ap-
pends words indicative of legitimate e-mail, and found
Naive Bayes extremely vulnerable to both scenarios of
active and passive attacks. Their results showed fre-
quent filter re-training could mitigate the effective of
these attacks. [Wittel and Wu, 2004] explored a simple
passive attack of poisoning with random words (a dic-
tionary attack) and found it ineffective against CRM1141,
but effective against SpamBayes.2 A smarter passive
attack with common or ‘hammy’ words (common word
or focused attack) saw SpamBayes perform even worse
but CRM114 remained very resistant. [Stern et al, 2004]
showed that injecting common words from the English
language led to the performance decrease of SpamBayes.
Published research indicates that Bayesian poisoning is
real and the number of published attack methods in-
dicates that it cannot be dismissed and that further
investigation on poisoning of statistical spam filters is
a worthwhile task of research.
2.3 Backscatter Spam
When an e-mail is sent, the sender is normally informed
if the e-mail could not be delivered or the delivery
was delayed for some reason. E-mail servers normally
send a bounce message notifying the sender of deliv-
ery problems. Such a message is termed - Delivery Sta-
tus Notification (DSN). Mostly, DSNs are welcome to
the sender and they are generally sent to the envelope
sender address. Backscatter occurs when DSNs are sent
to senders whose addresses are forged in the message
envelope by spammers. In other words, backscatter are
delivery notifications from another server, rejecting an
e-mail made to come across as being mailed from an
account [Cormack and Lynam, 2007]. These mails are
then delivered unsolicited in bulk quantities to a lot
1 CRM 114 - the Controllable Regex Mutilator, an open-
source spam filtering device
2 SpamBayes - a popular open-source spam filtering tool,
with 700,000 downloads, is based on techniques laid out by
Paul Graham.
of recipients. Hence, backscatter qualifies as unsolicited
bulk e-mail and is spam. Misdirected bounces from mail
servers, misdirected ”please confirm your subscription”
requests from mailing lists, ”out of office” vacation au-
toreplies and auto-responders, challenge requests from
Challenge/Request Systems, etc. are the major varieties
of backscatter. Backscatter, also called ‘collateral spam’
is a direct consequence of spam.
[Cormack and Lynam, 2007] experimented with six
open-source filters and a test set of 49,086 messages
with backscatter representing a mere 1% of the to-
tal spam in the test set. It was found that content-
based spam filters could filter 98% of the spam, but
backscatter was found to be most difficult to classify
with nearly all the backscatter messages being misclas-
sified. Backscatter is a problem that is hard to deal
with and though spammers may be blamed for it, it
simply exists because our mail servers are configured
to bounce messages back to fake addresses rather than
just reject such spam immediately [McMillan, 2008].
Servers that generate e-mail backscatter can land up
on various DNS-based Blacklists (DNSBLs). Improp-
erly configured e-mail servers gives rise to ‘open relays’
which contribute to the problem of backscatter. Open
relay servers can also get listed in various DNSBLs.
2.4 Image Spam
Text-based spam filters are designed only to analyze
different components of an e-mail (sender’s address,
header, body, attachments) and detect specific spam
characteristics. A new type of spam called image-based
spam or image spam is a rapidly spreading. It involves
textual spam content embedded into images that are at-
tached to e-mails. OCR (Optical Character Recognition)-
based modules are effective to a limited extent against
image-spam [Biggio et al, 2006] [Fumera, 2006]. But of-
ten the textual content is obfuscated by spammers to
evade OCR tools. Till 2010, the upsurge of spam e-mails
meant that roughly up to 85% of all e-mail spam were
image spam [Wu and Tsai, 2008].
SpamAssassin, a widely used commercial and open-
source spam filter provides several OCR plug-ins (e.g.
OCR Plugin 3, Fuzzy OCR Plugin4, and Bayes OCR
Plugin5) that can be used to detect image spam. It has
been established from current literature that the apply-
ing modern classification approaches to the generated
3 A SpamAssassin OCR plug-in is maintained at:
http://wiki.apache.org/spamassassin/OcrPlugin
4 Fuzzy OCR is available but no longer maintained.
5 A beta version of BayesOCR plugin is available at
http://pralab.diee.unica.it/en/BayesOCR
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text from image spam is very efficient. Later, signa-
tures were also generated to easily detect and filter al-
ready known image spam. The spam filter database by
mid-2012 contained more than 40 million relevant spam
signatures [IBM, 2012]. In order to avoid signature-
based techniques, spammers switched tactics by mak-
ing arbitrary alterations to a specified template image.
They began employing obfuscation, similar to the ap-
proach usually applied in web forums, to outsmart Op-
tical Character Recognition (OCR) tools. Lately, Pat-
tern Recognition techniques and Computer Vision are
playing a significant part in filtering of multimedia data.
However, the solutions achieved so far have shortcom-
ings, and their efficiency is yet to be systematically in-
vestigated [Biggio et al, 2006].
Image-based filtering involves extraction of relevant
features from the image and classification by state-of-
the-art classifiers. Image-based spam detection is an
example of classification of multimedia data. A num-
ber of researchers have devised approaches based on
Pattern Recognition and Computer Vision to address
different forms of image spam. In general they can be
grouped into two broad categories: a) OCR-based tech-
niques and b) Low level image features based tech-
niques. The use of OCR tools to extract text embedded
into images, and processing it using modern text cat-
egorization techniques was thoroughly investigated by
[Fumera, 2006]. But OCRs have been proven to be com-
putationally expensive and not accurate enough in ad-
versarial situations [Goodman et al, 2007] [Attar et al,
2011]. [Biggio et al, 2006] surveyed and categorized the
major techniques which have been suggested as image
spam solutions. Spilling of image spam onto social net-
works like Twitter or Facebook has become widespread.
Extraction of features for image-based spam filters is
further discussed in Sec 3. A detailed and recent review
involving definitions, spam tricks, complete classifica-
tion of image spam filtering techniques and datasets
may be found in [Wu and Tsai, 2008].
2.5 Botnet Spam
At a time when blacklists had almost put the spam-
mers out of business and diminished their profits, some
enterprising spammers joined hands with virus and ex-
ploit code writers to get access to compromised ma-
chines on the Internet known as ‘bots’ or ‘zombies’.
The term botnet applies to an army of machines that
are compromised and controlled by a single ‘botmaster ’.
A bot, when subverted (e.g. by a virus/Trojan infec-
tion or by a specific bot software), can be used to send
out spam or malware, harvest password and login in-
formation for identity theft and fraud, re-route users to
spoofed websites, or even recruit new bots, and so on.
Botnets on the other hand constitute a major threat to
the Internet infrastructure as they have the capability
to - mount crippling denial of service (DoS) attacks on
servers, generate click-fraud [Perera et al, 2013], send
out a flood of spam and backscatter [Xie et al, 2008]
facilitate phishing and pump-and-dump schemes, form
a computational grid to break weak passwords or ob-
fuscate the operators point of origin, etc. Botnets run
on the global level outside the range of national bound-
aries. According to public tracker Shadowserver 6, at
least one million zombie machines or bots are believed
to be active and the number is still growing.
Identifying and blacklisting each and every bot is
challenging, both because a botnet attack is momen-
tary and the fact that a single bot transmits only a
small volume of spam e-mails to avoid detection. On the
other hand spammers are using large Botnets to send
spam, thus creating extremely a huge number of IP ad-
dresses to be blacklisted. Grum, a sneaky, kernel-mode
rootkit was of notable interest to researchers. It was a
relatively small botnet with only 600,000 members. Yet
it was responsible for almost 25 percent, or 40 billion
spam e-mails a day before it was finally taken down.
Identifying botnets is a new challenge for the anti-spam
industry, and tracking spammers and bringing them to
justice, and pulling down botnet servers becomes an
international undertaking. July 18, 2012 saw the take
down of the Grum botnet [Sophos, 2013]. Recently, as a
repercussion of the bombing incident during the Boston
Marathon which happened on April 15, 2013, botnet
spam related to the Boston Marathon bombing was
found to have constituted 40 percent of all spam mes-
sages transmitted globally on subsequent days [CISCO,
2014].
According to CISCO report [CISCO, 2007], botnets
are the primary security threat on the Internet today.
Botnets are hard to detect because of their dynamic na-
ture and their adaptability in evading the common se-
curity defenses. Botnets have been studied thoroughly,
particularly in the context of spam and phishing [Xie
et al, 2008], [John et al, 2009] and [Zhuang et al, 2008].
Botnets are emerging as the most severe threat against
cyber-security as they provide a distributed platform
for several unlawful activities like distributed denial of
service (DDoS) attacks, malware dissemination, phish-
ing, scanning and click fraud. Because botnets attack
from multiple fronts there is no single technology that
can provide protection from it.
6 https://www.shadowserver.org/wiki/
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2.6 Social Engineering - Phishing
Spammers are increasingly adopting the use of social
engineering techniques in the spam campaign. Patient
and committed attackers perform extensive research and
gain a sophisticated understanding of the needs and
motivation of recipients and then contact them with
highly believable communications (e.g. e-mails or social
networking message) which may reflect knowledge of
the individuals’ work activities, colleagues, friends, and
family. Phishing is an illegal attempt that exploits both
social engineering and technical deception to acquire
sensitive confidential data (e.g. social security number,
e-mail address, passwords, etc.) and financial account
credentials [Robinson, 2003] [Bergholz et al, 2010]. Phish-
ing involves spam e-mails disguised as legitimate with a
subject or message designed to trick the victims into re-
vealing confidential information. In deceptive phishing,
e-mail notifications appearing to come from credit card
companies, security agencies, banks, providers, online
payment processors or IT administrators are commonly
used to exploit the unsuspecting public. The notifica-
tion encourages the recipient to urgently enter/update
their personal data. In most cases, the fraudsters try
to frighten a recipient by some ”urgent” matter (e.g.
”We suspect an unauthorized transaction on your ac-
count. To ensure that your account is not compromised,
please click the link below and confirm your identity”)
that requires their immediate attention and divulging
of their personal information. It is often accompanied
by a threat to block the account within a limited period,
if not responded. Once information such as user-name
and password are entered, it becomes a clear case of
identity theft followed by worse consequences such as
transfer of cash from a victims account, official docu-
ments being obtained, or goods being purchased using
stolen credentials. Malicious users are also interested in
other types of passwords, such as those for social net-
works, e-mail accounts and other services [Kaspersky,
2014]. In malware-based phishing, malicious software is
spread through e-mails or by exploiting security loop-
holes and installed on the user’s machine. The malware
may then capture user inputs, and confidential infor-
mation may be sent to the ‘phisher’ [Bergholz et al,
2010]. The phishers’ top targets in 2012 were social net-
works, financial institutions, non-profit organizations
and search engines [IBM, 2014] [Kaspersky, 2014].
Phishing attacks use e-mail as their main carrier in
order to allure unmindful victims. Phishing can also
occur on a fake web site that is a perfect replica of
the official site, such as the log-in page for a banking
web site, to harvest e-mail addresses and log-on cre-
dentials of their victims. The companies spoofed most
often were found to be Barclays, Bank of America, Pay-
Pal, eBay etc [Ludl et al, 2007]. Phishing attacks and
identity theft-based scams are becoming more sophis-
ticated in their exploitation of social engineering tech-
niques. While spamming affects bandwidth; social en-
gineering attacks like phishing directly affect their vic-
tims. In recent years ‘pharming ’ has evolved to be a ma-
jor concern to e-commerce and banks sites. In ‘Pharm-
ing ’ the attacker redirects unsuspecting users to fake
sites or proxy servers with seeded scripts [Abu-nimeh
et al, 2007] [Kaspersky, 2014]. The Internet Security
Threat Report [Symantec, 2014] states that in 2013 the
rate of phishing had increased, from 1 in 414 for 2012
to 1 in 392 in 2013. Much of these phishing attempts in-
volve the creation of fake login pages for popular social
networks sites. Besides spoofing login pages of legiti-
mate sites, phishers also began launching baits relevant
to current events for flavouring the phishing pages.
Several browser extensions (e.g. SafeCache and Safe-
History for Mozilla) and plug-ins (e.g. SpoofGuard) have
been proposed [Chou et al, 2004], [Stepp, 2005], [Nat-
takant, 2009] and [Sta, 2014]. [Chandrasekaran et al,
2006] have pointed out several weaknesses of existing
browser-based solutions and proposed a novel Support
Vector Machine (SVM) - based technique for e-mail
spam filtering based on the inherent structural prop-
erties in phishing e-mails. [Abu-nimeh et al, 2007] eval-
uated the predictive accuracy of six popular machine
learning-based classifiers on phishing data sets. Phish-
ing countermeasures such as secure e-mail authentica-
tion, password hashing, etc. involves high administra-
tive overhead, hence content-based filtering can be used
to detect phishing attacks and improve existing solu-
tions. While we agree client-side solutions for phishing
have been developed over the years even by huge soft-
ware companies, server-side solutions are the focus of
research [Abu-nimeh et al, 2007], [Fette et al, 2007] and
[Basnet et al, 2008].
Bergholz et al [2010] have identified a number of
highly informative features about phishing attempts
and also proposed a server-side statistical phishing fil-
ter. The success of phishing is largely determined by the
low levels of user-awareness regarding how the fraud-
sters and spoof sites operate. Increasing user aware-
ness will help them to learn to spot the telltale signs
of social engineering tricks, which includes, undue pres-
sure, a false sense of urgency, bogus official letters, too-
good-to-be-true offers, quid-pro-quo offers, etc. Mean-
while spam filters remain the first line of defense against
phishing. According to Anti-Phishing Working Group
[Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG), 2014] new brands
continue to be targeted by phishers and to battle these
8 Alexy Bhowmick, Shyamanta M. Hazarika
phishing attacks, presently the world needs more phish-
ing databases.
3 Corpus Preprocessing
Not all information present in an e-mail is necessary
or useful. Eliminating the less informative and noisy
terms lowers the feature space dimensionality and en-
hances classification performance in most cases [Guzella
and Caminhas, 2009], [Diao et al, 2003] and [Shi et al,
2012]. Corpus preprocessing is a process that involves
transforming the mail corpus into a uniform format that
is more comprehensible to the machine learning algo-
rithms [Zhang et al, 2004], [Katakis et al, 2007]. Due
to the adversarial nature of spam, spam filters need to
constantly adapt to changing spam tactics, particularly
in feature extraction and feature selection aspects. No
matter which learning strategy is chosen for the train-
ing and testing of content-based filters, it is extremely
crucial to handcraft a private corpus or use a corpus
that is publicly available. In any case, e-mails need to
undergo preprocessing as a preparation for feature ex-
traction. Furthermore, a corpus may have an immense
number of features, it is very important to choose fea-
tures judiciously so as to prevent the classifiers from
over-fitting [Drucker et al, 1999]. The effectiveness and
success of content-based spam filters depends on - fea-
ture engineering i.e. defining and creating those features
more likely to make the classifier perform better. The
primary steps involved in extraction of features from an
e-mail are -
– Lexical Analysis (Tokenization): The string of
text representing a message is tokenized in order
to identify the candidate words to be adopted as
relevant spam or ham terms. Headers, attachments,
and HTML tags are stripped, leaving behind just
the e-mail body and subject line text. IP addresses
and domain names can also be considered as tokens.
– Stop-word Removal : Stop-word removal involves
removing frequently used non-informative words, e.g.
‘a’, ‘an’, ‘the’, and ‘is’, etc. Obscure texts or sym-
bols may also be removed in subsequent steps. Stop-
word removal makes the selection of candidate terms
more efficient and reduces the feature space consid-
erably.
– Stemming : Word-stemming is a term used to de-
scribe a process of converting words to their mor-
phological base forms, mainly eliminating plurals,
tenses, gerund forms, prefixes and suffixes. Stem-
ming is closely related to lemmatization which while
reducing a word considers the part of speech and
the context of the word. The primary advantages of
employing word stemming and lemmatization are
feature space dimension reduction and classifier ac-
curacy.
– Representation : Involves the conversion of an e-
mail message into a specific or structured format
as needed by the machine learning algorithm being
employed.
[Androutsopoulos et al, 2000a] studied the effect of
corpus size, lemmatization, and stop-lists while in [An-
droutsopoulos et al, 2000c], they studied the effect of
word stemming and stop-word removal on the perfor-
mancce of classifiers. Their results show that often they
do not contribute to much improvement over the filters
without them. [Chih-Chin Lai and Tsai, 2004] found
that stemming did not introduce any significant im-
provement in the filter’s performance, though it did re-
duce the feature set size. On the contrary, employing
stopping produced better performance.
3.1 Extracting Features
The easiest feature extraction method is the bag of
words (BOW) model (or vector-space model), in which
words occurring in the e-mail are treated as features.
Given a set of terms T = {t1, t2, t3...tn}, the bag of
words model represents a document d as an N-dimensional
feature vector x = {x1, x2, x3...xn} where xi is a func-
tion of the occurrence of ti in d. It is possible to use all
the features for classification. However a feature selec-
tion mechanism may be applied to select the best N fea-
tures by some measure and thus reduce dimensionality.
Another simple text representation is the bag of charac-
ter n-grams. [Kanaris et al, 2006] investigated on char-
acter n-grams and words in spam filtering to demon-
strate the advantage of n-grams over word-tokens. Sparse
Binary Polynomial Hashing (SBPH) [Yerazunis, 2003]
is another feature generator from e-mails. However, its
many features made it computationally heavy and of
limited use. Siefkes et al [2004] proposed an effective
feature combination technique known as the Orthog-
onal Sparse Bigrams (OSB) to extract more compact
features. Experiments showed that OSB slightly per-
formed better than SBPH with regard to error rate.
Recently, [Zhu and Tan, 2011] proposed a feature ex-
traction approach based on local concentration (LC)
which efficiently extracted position-correlated informa-
tion from e-mail messages. For each style of e-mail anal-
ysis, a spam filter developer must decide on a way for
performing feature extraction.
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3.2 Feature Selection
Feature selection is a key issue and has become the sub-
ject of much research. It has a three-fold objective: i)
enhancing the prediction accuracy of the classifiers, ii)
building faster and economical classifiers, and iii) ob-
taining a better understanding of the elementary pro-
cess involved in generation of data [Guyon, 2003]. Di-
mensionality reduction and feature subset selection are
two preferred techniques for lowering the feature set
dimension. While feature subset selection involves the
extraction of a subset of the original attributes, dimen-
sionality reduction involves linear combinations of the
original feature set [Gansterer and Ecker, 2008]. [Cor-
mack, 2008] suggests stop-word removal as a trivial ex-
ample of feature selection, and stemming as a simple
example of dimensionality reduction. Information Gain
(IG) is one of the simplest and most successful tech-
niques for feature selection. As discussed earlier, natu-
ral language processing provides different feature selec-
tion ways, the simplest being the ‘bag of words’ model
coupled with ‘stemming ’ and ‘stopping ’. [Zhang et al,
2004] investigated the impact of three popular feature
selection techniques - Document Frequency (DF), In-
formation Gain (IG) and χ2 (CHI) test. A novel fea-
ture selection method named Comprehensively Measure
Feature Selection (CMFS) was presented and evaluated
with popular feature selection methods - Information
Gain (IG), Chi statistic (CHI), Document Frequency
(DF), Orthogonal Centroid Feature Selection (OCFS)
and DIA association factor (DIA) to demonstrate that
the new method notably outperformed them all [Yang
et al, 2012]. Several well-known methods for feature
selection are explained and compared with new fea-
ture selection methods in [Yang and Pedersen, 1997],
[Yang et al, 2011] and [Gomez et al, 2012]. [Toolan and
Carthy, 2010] address the issue of effective feature se-
lection by exploring the utility of over 40 features (ex-
tracted from ham, spam and phishing pages) that have
been used in recent literature.
3.3 E-mail Header Analysis
E-mail headers determine the recipient of a message and
record the specific route the message takes as it passes
through each mail server. Message headers are very re-
liable and powerful sources containing discriminative
features for spam filtering besides the Subject and e-
mail content. In fact, experimental results confirm that
the e-mail header provides powerful cues for machine
learning algorithms to efficiently filter out spam e-mails
[Chih-Chin Lai and Tsai, 2004], [Zhang et al, 2004],
[Sheu, 2007] and [Wang and Chen, 2007]. This fact was
Fig. 3 The header of a typical e-mail.
unknown in spam filtering research before and much
research focused on the e-mail message body only.
According to [Zhang et al, 2004], a spam filter trained
using header features alone can achieve better or com-
parable results than the body solution. Statistical anal-
ysis by [Wang and Chen, 2007] showed that 92.5% of
10,024 junk e-mails were filtered out using the header
features - message-ID, mail user agent (MUA), sender
address etc. [Hu et al, 2010] and [Al-jarrah et al, 2012]
note performance evaluation of several header-based
spam classifiers and evaluated their performance in fil-
tering e-mail spam. [Sheu, 2007] mined association rules
out of other basic attributes in the e-mail header ses-
sions and proposed an efficient decision tree-based spam
filtering method. E-mail Header analysis has evolved to
be a very promising research area. As a filter technique
it has the capability to provide low false positive rates
either by itself or when used with other anti-spamming
techniques.
3.4 Filters Based on Non-content Features
Much research has been accomplished in e-mail classi-
fication proposing general and specific solutions to the
spam problem. However, most of these approaches ex-
plored only the content-based features [Drucker et al,
1999], [Androutsopoulos et al, 2000b], [Androutsopou-
los et al, 2000a] and [Sakkis et al, 2001]. Filtering based
solely on e-mail content has been argued to be a fun-
damentally flawed idea. Although such content-based
methods have been effective, the perfectly malleable
content of an e-mail and spammers reactivity to filter-
ing methods gives rise to many challenges [mentioned in
Section 2.1 and 2.2]. Different features such as tempo-
ral information, message length, MIME content type,
proportion of symbols in e-mail body, presence of at-
tachments, number of URLs in the e-mail, etc., are con-
sidered non-content features, and have led to promising
results in differentiating incoming e-mails. Non-content
features may include header features such as ‘origi-
nator field ’, ‘destination field ’, ‘X-mailer field ’ etc. but
they are not limited to header features. [Hu et al, 2010],
[Hershkop and Stolfo, 2005], and [Wang et al, 2005] de-
scribe exploiting non-content features for profiling e-
mails and developing efficient and scalable non-content
based spam-filtering frameworks. Table 1 illustrates the
popular approaches for feature extraction and feature
selection adopted by researchers and their key infer-
ences.
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Table 1 A summary of Feature Extraction and Feature Selection techniques in popular literature.
Authors Approaches
[Zhang et al, 2004] Studied subject line, header, and message body.
Employed Information Gain (IG), Document Frequency (DF), and χ2 test (CHI) for feature
selection.
Found bag of words model quite effective on spam filtering, and header features as important as
message body.
[Kanaris et al, 2006] Extracted character n-grams of fixed length, Variable-length character n-grams
Explored Information Gain (IG) as a feature selection technique
Character n-grams were noted to be richer and definitve than word-tokens.
[Delany and Bridge, 2006] Considered features of three types: word, character, structured features. in a feature-based vs
feature-free comparison.
Employed Information Gain (IG) as a feature selection technique
Noted feature-free methods to be more correct than the feature-based system, however feature-
free approaches took much longer than feature-based approach in classifying e-mails.
[Yeh et al, 2005] Used behavioral patterns of spammers, Metaheuristics as features
Employed Term Frequency, Inverse Document Frequency (TFIDF), SpamKANN for feature
selection
Tested SVM, Decision trees, Naive Bayes to get increased prediction accuracy than keywords.
[Diao et al, 2003] Experimented on features: Header (H), Textual (T), handcrafted features (HH), etc.
Different ways of feature selection for Decision Tree and Naive Bayes models were evaluated
The usefulness and importance of different type of features were discussed in detail in experi-
ments.
[Me´ndez et al, 2006] Considered subject, body, header, attachment feature.
Analyzed strength and weaknesses of Document frequency (DF), Information Gain (IG) and χ2
test (CHI), Mutual Information.
Presented a deep analysis of feature selection methods. Found e-mail attachments to be useful
when integrated with models.
3.4.1 Analyzing Temporal Features
As a novel solution to the spam problem, [Kiritchenko
et al, 2004] employed temporal features of an e-mail to
the conventional content-based approaches to create a
richer information space to work with. A simple exam-
ple of a temporal feature, obtainable from the message
header timestamps, is the day of the week or the time of
the day the e-mail was received. They represented tem-
poral information in the form of temporal patterns, pre-
sented an algorithm for mining temporal patterns in an
e-mail sequence and described approaches to integrate
temporal patterns into content-based e-mail classifica-
tion. [Hao et al, 2009] explored various spatio-temporal
features of e-mail senders and investigated ways to de-
duce the reputation of an e-mail sender based only on
such features. To improve the state of affairs they pre-
sented SNARE - a sender reputation system with ro-
bust classification accuracy. Investigations reveal that
the use of temporal features to improve spam filter ac-
curacy is perhaps one of the most uncharted territories
in spam filtering research.
3.4.2 SMTP Path Analysis
SMTP path analysis operates by learning about the
‘spamminess’ or goodness of IP addresses by examining
the history of e-mail delivered through that IP address.
SMTP traffic analysis when used in combination with
traditional filters does improve the accuracy of the fil-
ters. [Leiba et al, 2005] established that examining IP
addresses was useful and presented a new algorithm for
learning the reputation of e-mail domains and IP ad-
dresses by examining the SMTP path used to transmit
e-mails. Beverly and Sollins [Beverly and Sollins, 2008]
examined a variety of SMTP flow characteristics and
developed a spam classifier ‘SpamFlow ’ based on the
statistical discriminatory power of these flows.
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3.4.3 Behavior Analysis
The behavioral pattern of an e-mail is ‘what the sender
does in composing or distributing e-mails’. Legitimate
e-mails have mostly normal and meaningful behavioral
patterns, while spam e-mails have abnormal or even
conflicting behavior patterns. [Yeh et al, 2005] consid-
ered behavior patterns such as data spoofing, time
anomaly, relay anomaly, etc; and described them by
meta-heuristics and employed them as features for the
classification task. To recognize spam and viruses as
irregular behviour in the e-mail, [Hershkop, 2006] pro-
posed some behavior models, some of them are recip-
ient frequency, group communication, user’s past ac-
tivity histogram, etc. [Ramachandran and Feamster,
2006] studied the spammer’s behaviour at the network
level and found that most spam was received from a
small number of regions of IP address space. They sug-
gested that filtering based on network-level character-
istics would be much more effective to combat spam
as network-level properties are less malleable than e-
mail content. [Li et al, 2007] performed an experimen-
tal study of the community behavior of spammers and
came up with various clustering structures among their
population. Based on those structures they proposed
some group-based anti-spam strategies exploiting group
membership of perceived spam sources. Further work on
investigating clustering structures of spammers based
on features as - Content length, Time of arrival, Fre-
quency of e-mail, etc. was carried out by [Hao et al,
2009].
3.4.4 Analyzing Users Social Network
Social networks are very helpful for determining the
trustworthiness of outsiders and hence recent spam fil-
tering approaches have started to exploit social network
interactions to distinguish between spam and ham. For
their social network based classification scheme, [Boykin
and Roychowdhury, 2005] analyzed the e-mail header
fields to construct a social network graph of the user,
and then classified e-mail messages based on ‘clustering
coefficient’ of the graph subcomponent. The clustering
coefficient is very low for spammers, while it is high for
a network of friends. The algorithm was found to be im-
mune to false positives and could correctly classify 50%
of all e-mails correctly. [Chirita et al, 2009] and [Gol-
beck and Hendler, 2004] further developed the idea of
creating a social network graph for inferring reputation
ratings of individuals or e-mail addresses.
Table 2, summarizes and categorizes popular ma-
chine learning attempts by authors according to per-
spective (Algorithm, Architecture, Methods, and Trends).
Articles classified under ‘Algorithm’ reflect research that
essentially focused on classification algorithms and their
implementations and evaluations. Articles classified un-
der ‘Architecture’ concentrated on work mainly involved
with the development of spam filtering infrastructures.
Articles classified under ‘Methods’ refers to study of
the existing filtering methods while ‘Trends’ speaks of
discourses concentrating on emerging methods and the
adaptation of spam filtering methods over time. Limi-
tations listed in the last column, corresponding to each
article are as acknowledged by the authors themselves.
4 Methods for Mitigating E-mail Spam
Although there are ‘social ’ methods like legal measures
and personal measures (e.g. never respond to spam,
never forward chain-letters) to fight spam, they have
had a narrow effect on spam so far is seen by the num-
ber of spam messages received daily by users. Technical
measures seem to be the most effective in countering
spam. Prior to machine learning techniques, many dif-
ferent technical measures were employed for spam fil-
tering, like - rule-based spam filtering, white lists, black
lists, challenge-response (C/R) systems, spam filtering,
honey pots, OCR filters, and many others, each with
its own merits and drawbacks. Black-lists, white-lists,
challenge-response (C/R) systems, etc. are origin-based
techniques used by reputation-based filters. We discuss
briefly some of these popular approaches:
4.1 Heuristic Filters
Initial spam filters followed the ‘knowledge engineering ’
approach and were based on coded rules or heuristics
Sanz [2008]. A content-based heuristic filter analyzes
the contents of a message M and classifies it to spam
or ham based on the occurrence of ‘spammy’ words like
‘viagra’ or ‘lottery ’ in it. They were designed based on
the knowledge of regularities or patterns observed in
messages Guzella and Caminhas [2009]. Cohen’s Cohen
[1996] was one of the earliest attempts to use learning
machines that classify e-mail. Based on the RIPPER
rule-learning algorithm he employed a new method for
learning from corpus sets of ”keyword-spotting rules”
to classify personal e-mails into pre-defined categories.
He showed that the RIPPER algorithm can achieve a
comparable performance to a traditional information
retrieval (IR) method based on TF-IDF weighting.
The drawback of heuristic filters is that maintain-
ing an effective set of rules is a time consuming affair,
moreover the rules have to be constantly updated to
keep up with the newest trends in spam. Spammers
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Table 2 A summary popular machine learning attempts by authors according to perspective (Algorithm, Architecture, Meth-
ods, and Trends), with their strengths and limitations.
Ref. Perspective Strengths and Limitations
Tretyakov [2004]
Naive Bayes, k-NN, ANN, SVM Techniques benefits beginners.
Algorithms, Methods Does not deal with feature selection.
[Androutsopoulos et al, 2006]
Naive Bayes, LogitBoost, SVM Resulted in - LingSpam and PU1.
Algorithm, Methods, Trends Ignored headers, HTML, attachments.
[Carpinter and Hunt, 2006]
Bayesian filtering Broad review of implementations.
Methods, Architecture Focuses primarily on automated, filters.
[Blanzieri and Bryl, 2008]
SVM, TF-IDF, Boosting Explains feature extraction methods.
Algorithms, Methods, Trends Does not cover neighboring topics.
[Cormack, 2008]
SVM, Perceptron, Winnow, OSBF Testing achieves FPR = 0.2 %.
Algorithms, Methods, Trends User feedback difficult to simulate.
[Guzella and Caminhas, 2009]
Regression, Ensembles Focuses on textual and image analysis.
Algorithms, Methods Focuses only on application specific aspects.
[Almeida and Yamakami, 2010]
SVM, Naive Bayes Proposed Matthews correlation coefficient (MCC).
Algorithms, Methods Need to compare with other algorithms & corpuses.
[Almeida and Yamakami, 2012]
MDL principle, SVM Uses six, well known, large public databases.
Algorithms, Methods Bogofilter, SpamAssassin filters not considered.
[Caruana and Li, 2012]
Signature, k-NN, ANN, SVM Focuses on distributed computing paradigms.
Methods, Architecture Avoids implementation and interoperability issues.
[Wang et al, 2013]
Statistical analysis, n-grams Investigated topic drift.
Trends Limited datasets.
began employing content ”obfuscation” (or obscuring),
by disguising certain terms that are very common in
Spam messages (e.g., by writing ”v!@gra” instead of
”viagra”, or ”F*r*e*e” instead of ”Free”) on an attempt
to prevent the correct identification of these terms by
Spam filters. Moreover writing regular expression-based
rules are hard and error prone. In spite of these limi-
tations, Symantec Brightmail Sanz [2008], a rule-based
filter solution was a success from 2004 till the end of the
last decade. It could even track down IP addresses that
sent mostly junk mail and performed competitively to
SpamBayes - a popular Nave Bayes-based anti-spam
solution.
4.2 Blacklisting
A blacklist of E-mail addresses or IP addresses of the
server from which spam is found to originate is created
and maintained either at the user or server level. If a
user receives an e-mail from any of these addresses, the
message is automatically blocked at the SMTP connec-
tion phase. This method requires only a simple lookup
in the blacklist every time; hence the computational
cost is low. Black-lists include Real-time Blackhole ListS
(RBL) and Domain Name System Black-lists. Com-
mon black-list databases include proxies or open re-
lays, networks or individual addresses guilty of sending
spam. Google blacklists and SpamHaus 7 are examples
of blacklists.
Blacklist techniques though effective, suffer from many
drawbacks. A legitimate address may be blacklisted by
the filter erroneously or arbitrarily. Innocent users can
get victimized and entire domains (e.g. Hotmail) can
get blocked when e-mail IDs or IP addresses are used
by spammers without the owners consent. As spam-
7 http://www.spamhaus.org/
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mers resort to use of new E-mail IDs or IP addresses
to bypass blacklists, frequent updates are required to
keep the blacklists up-to-date. Lately, use of botnets by
spammers creates an extremely huge number of IP ad-
dresses to be blacklisted. While the time and effort for
updating can be overwhelming, any lag in its timeliness
leads to vulnerabilities.
4.3 Whitelisting
Whitelisting is the reverse of blacklisting. An e-mail
whitelist is a list of pre-approved or trusted contacts,
domains, or IP addresses that are able to communicate
to a mail user. All e-mails from fresh e-mail addresses
are blocked by this method. This restrictive method
may introduce an extremely high false positive rate
instead of reducing it. Such a method may be good
for instant messaging environments but is not a good
choice as it prohibits establishing new contacts through
e-mail. Moreover if spammers somehow got their hands
on the whitelist, it would be easy to evade the filter us-
ing spoofed addresses, or using well-known whitelisted
mailing lists. This method requires a lot of maintenance
but provides moderate filtering rate. It can be employed
together with other anti-spam techniques [Michelakis
et al, 2004].
4.4 Greylisting
When an SMTP client connects requesting for a session
for the first time, the recipient server may check if the
IP address of the sender or its e-mail address is blocked
or pre-approved. It may happen they are neither in the
blacklist nor in the whitelist. In that case the message
is rejected temporarily and the recipient MTA responds
with an SMTP temporary error message. The recipient
MTA then records the identity of recent attempts and
its databases are updated with the new clients informa-
tion; as required by SMTP RFC [P. Resnick, 2001], the
client retries at a later point of time. The next attempt
may be accepted for legitimate senders. This method
assumes that spammers do not waste time in queuing
or retrying their messages and those who do so will
probably end up being blacklisted in public blacklists
(DNSBLS) during the two attempts. While this tech-
nique seems very effective, evading it can also be very
simple. The spammers can use zombies to do the work
of retrying for the spammer.
4.5 Challenge Response (CR) systems
While white-lists place the burden of determining the
authenticity of contacts on the receiver, Challenge-Response
(CR) systems transfer the burden of authentication back
to the sender. After sending an e-mail to the receiver,
the sender receives a challenge from the receiving Mail
Transfer Agent (MTA). The challenge may range from
a simple question to a CAPTCHA (”Completely Auto-
mated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans
Apart”). The sender is obliged to reply correctly in his
response; else his message will be deleted or put into
spam folder. While this method is effective in catch-
ing spam from automated systems or botnets, it intro-
duces an undesirable delay in the delivery process. CR
systems are controversial solutions and are often criti-
cized due to this inconvenience caused by the overhead
in communication. Besides legitimate e-mails from au-
tomated mailing lists may also be blocked since these
will fail the challenge. In addition, CR systems are also
believed to be the cause behind the backscatter e-mail
phenomenon. [Isacenkova and Balzarotti, 2011] devel-
oped a real world deployment of a CR based anti-spam
system and evaluated its effectiveness and impact on
end-users.
4.6 Collaborative Spam filtering
Spammers typically send spam to a vast number of
recipients. It is likely that the same spam has been
received by somebody else. Collaborative spam filter-
ing is a distributed approach to filtering spam where a
whole community works together with a shared knowl-
edge about spam [Me´ndez et al, 2006], [Sophos, 2013],
and [Garriss et al, 2006]. The collaborative approach
does not consider the content of e-mails; rather it re-
quires the accumulation of any identifying information
concerning spam messages, like - the subject, sender,
the result of computing a mathematical function over
the email body, etc. Spam messages have digital foot-
prints which are shared with the community by early
receivers. The community users then use these spam fin-
gerprints for identifying spam e-mails. Vipuls Razor 8,
Pyzor 9, DCC (Distributed Checksum Clearinghouse)
10 are examples of collaborative spam filters on the web.
Though it is certain that collaborative techniques show
great promise, however such schemes suffer from scala-
bility issues and some underlying implicit assumptions.
8 http://razor.sourceforge.net/
9 https://github.com/SpamExperts/pyzor
10 http://www.rhyolite.com/dcc/
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4.7 Honey pots
A honeypot is a decoy server or system set up solely
to collect spam or gather information about intruders
Andreolini et al [2005]. It is also used to identify e-
mail address harvesters with the help of specially gener-
ated e-mail addresses and to detect e-mail relays. It is a
finger-print based technique for content based spam fil-
tering. Honeypots do help security professionals and re-
searchers learn the techniques used by attackers to com-
promise computer systems. Bringer et al [2012] present
a proper survey on the evolution in honeypots as well as
advances and the current trends in honeypot research
to cope with recently emerging security threats.
4.8 Signature Schemes
Most current antivirus products work on the basis of
signatures. The hashes of previously identified spam
messages are kept in a database at the Mail Transfer
Agent (MTA) level. All incoming e-mails are checked
against these hashes to distinguish between spam and
legitimate e-mails. Because signatures match exact pat-
terns, this scheme can detect known spams with a very
high level of confidence. However, a strong shortcoming
is that unknown or newly generated spam will be able
to get past this filter without being detected. Signature
databases need to be updated hourly, daily or weekly.
The database can swell as thousands of spams are gen-
erated every day. Spammers can introduce a random
string into spam mails to generate different hashes.
This review article examined a number of major ear-
lier surveys on spam filtering over the period (2004-
2015). Perusing the different spam techniques and the
methods used by researchers to combat spam, taxon-
omy of spam filtering techniques is presented above (Ta-
ble 3).
5 Machine Learning Approach to E-mail Spam
filtering: The Algorithms
Spam filtering is a binary classification task, in which
legitimate (good or ham) e-mails are treated as nega-
tive (-) instances, and spam as positive (+) instances
[Song et al, 2009]. Machine Learning is a subfield of
computer science that explores the design and develop-
ment of computer systems that automatically improve
their performance in a task based on experience. Au-
tomatic e-mail classification uses statistical approaches
or machine learning techniques and aims at building a
model or a classifier specifically for the task of filter-
ing spam from a users mail stream. Some of the most
popular Machine Learning techniques to counter spam
filtering are Naive Bayes [M. Sahami, S. Dumais, D.
Heckerman et al, 1998], [Androutsopoulos et al, 2000a],
Support Vector Machines [] Woitaszek and Shaaban
[2003], [Amayri and Bouguila, 2010]], Decision Trees
[Yeh et al, 2005], [Toolan and Carthy, 2010], Neural
Networks [Wu, 2009], [Soranamageswari and Meena,
2010], etc. The building of the model or classifier re-
quires a set of pre-classified documents (training set or
an initial corpus). The process of building the model is
called training.
Machine learning algorithms have achieved more suc-
cess among all previous techniques (discussed in Sec-
tion 4) employed in the task of spam filtering [Fdez-
Riverola et al, 2007a], [Almeida et al, 2010]. In fact,
the success stories of Gmail [Taylor et al, 2007], [The,
2010], can be ascribed to their timely transition and
successful use of Machine Learning for filtering not just
incoming spam but other abuses like Denial-of-Service
(DoS), virus delivery, and other imaginative attacks
[Taylor et al, 2007]. Today the most successful spam
filters are based upon the statistical foundations of Ma-
chine Learning. In part it is because it is easier to train
and build a classifier on e-mails that individual mail
users receive, than to build and tune a set of filtering
rules. Machine Learning based spam filters also retrain
themselves while put in use and minimizes manual ef-
fort while delivering superior filtering accuracy. In this
section we explore the underlying theory and aim to
present a clear picture of popular Machine Learning al-
gorithms employed in spam filtering for the benefit of
readers unfamiliar with them. Table 3 provides a tax-
onomy of e-mail spam filtering techniques.
5.1 Naive Bayes (NB)
Naive Bayes classifiers are a technique that has re-
mained popular over the years and are arguably the
most well-known statistical spam classifier. It is called
‘naive’ because it ignores possible dependencies or cor-
relations among inputs and reduces a multivariate prob-
lem to a group of uni-variate problems [M. Sahami, S.
Dumais, D. Heckerman et al, 1998]. It employs a prob-
abilistic approach to inference. It does not need any
complicated iterative parameter estimation schemes, as
in Discriminant analysis. It is easy to construct, easy
to interpret, surprisingly effective and can be readily
applied to huge data sets [Wu et al, 2007], making
it extremely popular among users. Bayesian methods
typically require prior knowledge of many probabili-
ties e.g., according to Grahams [Graham, 2002a] cor-
pus, the word ‘sex ’ indicates a 97% probability that the
containing e-mail is spam. Similarly, words like ‘viagra’
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Table 3 A taxonomy of e-mail spam filtering techniques.
Reputation-based Content-based (Textual) Content-based (Multimedia)
Reputation based
Origin based
Blacklists
Whitelists
Origin Diversity
Analysis
Social Networks
Implicit
Explicit
Traffic analysis
Mail Volume
SMTP Flow
Protocol based
C-R Systems
Greylisting
Textual content
Heuristics
Rule based
Fingerprint based
Honeypots
Digest based
Signature/Checksum
schemes
Machine Learning
Naive Bayes
Support Vector
Machines
Decision Trees
Clustering
Ensembles
Multimedia content
OCR techniques
Keyword detection
Text
Categorization
High Level
Analysis
Low-level Features
Image
Classification
Near Duplicate
Detection
and ‘refinance’ will have high spam probability values,
while names of friends and siblings will have low spam
probability values. These apriori probabilities are com-
bined with the observed data set - which is a sizeable
collection of e-mails that has already been categorized
as ‘spam’ and ‘ham’, to determine the final probabil-
ity that an e-mail message is either spam or legitimate.
Even with the flawed assumption of presumed decorre-
lation, Bayesian classifiers work extremely well and are
surprisingly effective [M. Sahami, S. Dumais, D. Heck-
erman et al, 1998], [Pantel and Lin, 1998], [Graham,
2003] and [Yerazunis, 2004].
Nave Bayes method has become extremely popular
due to the high levels of accuracy that it can potentially
provide and it often serves as a baseline classifier for
comparison with other filtering approaches. Bayesian
filters are the most employed filters for classifying spam
nowadays Guzella and Caminhas [2009], Metsis et al
[2006] and can operate either on the network mail server
level or on client e-mail programs.
One limitation of standard Bayesian filters is that it
ignores the correlation among inputs or events; i.e. such
filters do not consider that the words ‘special ’ and ‘of-
fers’ are more likely to appear together in spam e-mail
than in legitimate e-mail Carpinter and Hunt [2006].
But text analysis confirms that words have a very sig-
nificant correlation and are not chosen randomly. In
spite of this over simplistic assumption, Bayesian classi-
fiers have been found to work remarkably well Androut-
sopoulos et al [2006] and Almeida et al [2010]. How-
ever to address this limitation, Yerazunis [2003] and
Siefkes et al [2004] introduced sparse binary polynomial
hashing (SBPH) and orthogonal sparse bigrams (OSB).
SBPH is a generalization of Bayesian filtering that can
match mutating phrases as well as individual words or
tokens, and uses the Bayesian Chain Rule (BCR) to
combine the individual feature conditional probabilities
into an overall probability. SBPH had a more expressive
feature space and delivered ¿99.9% accuracy on real-
time e-mail without white-lists or blacklists from as lit-
tle as 500K of pre-categorized text. However, SBPH was
computationally expensive; OSB retains the expressiv-
ity of SBPH but avoids most of the cost. A filter based
on OSB, along with the non-probabilistic Winnow al-
gorithm as a replacement for the Bayesian Chain Rule
outperformed SBPH by 0.04% error rate; however, OSB
used just 6, 00,000 features, while SBPH used 1,600,000
features to reach best results. Yerazunis [2004] argued
that most Bayesian filters seem to reach a plateau of
accuracy at 99.9 percent so enhancements were nec-
essary. They set up a SBPH/BCR classifier and com-
pared three different training methods: TEFT Train
Every Thing, TOE Train Only Errors, TUNE Train
Until No Errors, and found TOE training to be ac-
ceptable in performance and accuracy. Different exten-
sions to Bayesian filtering as Token Grab Bag, Token
Sequence Sensitive, Sparse Binary Polynomial Hash-
ing with Bayesian Chain Rule (SBPH/BCR), Peaking
Sparse Binary Polynomial Hashing, Markovian match-
ing, were also tested. Markovian matching produced the
best performance of all the filters.
According to Ludlow [2002], the vast majority of the
tens of millions of spam e-mails might be the handiwork
of only 150 spammers around the world; Again, au-
thors have ‘textual fingerprints’, at least for texts pro-
duced by writers who are not consciously changing their
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style of writing across texts, as argued by Baayen et al
[2002]. Therefore authorship identification techniques
can be used to identify the ‘textual fingerprints’ of this
small group and eliminate a significant proportion of
spam. Brien and Vogel [2003] were the first to apply
authorship identification techniques as ‘Chi by degrees
of freedom’ method to the area of e-mail spam filter-
ing. The authors examined the Nave Bayesian method
in relation to this authorship identification technique.
They found that the Bayesian method was very effec-
tive when characters were used as tokens, rather than
when words were used as tokens. The ‘Chi by degrees of
freedom’ method when used with characters as tokens
had an error rate lesser than the Bayes method. They
concluded that tokens chosen affected the precision and
recall parameters. Taking a leaf out of text classifica-
tion, Song et al [2009] proposed a correlation-based doc-
ument term weighting method to address the problem
of low-FPR classification in the context of Nave Bayes.
[Chih-Chin Lai and Tsai, 2004] conducted system-
atized experiments on e-mail categorization involving
Naive Bayes (NB), Term Frequency - Inverse Document
Frequency (TF-IDF), k-Nearest Neighbor (k-NN), and
Support Vector Machines (SVMs). NB, TF-IDF and
SVM achieved satisfactory results while k-NN had the
worst performance out of all. It was seen that stemming
did not affect performance, however employing stopping
procedure yielded better performance. They concluded
that combining the different techniques seemed a very
promising prospect. [Lai, 2007] has made a similar com-
parative study on three commonly used algorithms in
Machine Learning NB, k-NN and SVMs. From exper-
imental results, NB and SVM were found to perform
better than k-NN. [Youn and Mcleod, 2006] and [Yu
and Xu, 2008] noted similar experiments with four ma-
chine learning algorithm each. [Seewald, 2007] investi-
gated the simple Naive Bayes learner represented by
SpamBayes, and two variants of Naive Bayes learning,
SA-Train and CRM-114. SA-Train incorporated back-
ground knowledge made up of rules while CRM-114
considered multi-word phrases and their probability es-
timates. It was seen that all three systems performed
equally well and the addition of background knowledge
to SA-Train and the extended description language in
the case of CRM-114 considering multi-word phrases
failed to improve Bayesian learning significantly. Spam-
Bayes offered the most stable performance and deteri-
orated least over time. [Almeida et al, 2010] reported
that probabilistic approaches like Bayesian classifica-
tion suffer from the ‘curse of dimensionality ’. They ver-
ified how dimensionality reduction influences the accu-
racy of Nave Bayesian spam filters.
5.2 Support Vector Machines (SVMs)
Support vector machines (SVMs) are ranked as one of
the best ‘off-the-shelf ’ supervised learning algorithm.
SVMs have become one of the most sought-after classi-
fiers in the Machine Learning community because they
provide superior generalization performance, require less
examples for training, and can tackle high-dimensional
data with the help of kernels [Rios and Zha, 2004] [Wu
et al, 2007]. Support vector machines (SVMs) result
by mapping the feature vectors (training data) into a
linear or non-linear feature space through a kernel func-
tion. The feature space generates an optimal separating
hyper-plane (OSH) which splits the positive samples
and the negative samples with maximum margin. The
hyper-plane is then employed as a non-linear decision
boundary for use in real-world data.
[Drucker et al, 1999] used SVMs for content-based
classification and equated their performance with other
classifiers - Ripper, Rocchio, and boosting of C4.5 deci-
sion trees. It was found that boosting trees and SVMs
attained good performance with regard to speed and ac-
curacy during testing. SVMs with binary features pro-
duced best results, required lesser training, and their
performance did not degrade when too many features
were used. Woitaszek and Shaaban [Woitaszek and Shaa-
ban, 2003] utilized an SVM-based filter for Microsoft
Outlook to identify commercial e-mail. Classification
models for spam and ham messages were built by the
SVM using personal and impersonal dictionaries. Both
yielded identical results attaining a best accuracy of
96.69%. [Rios and Zha, 2004] experimented with SVMs
and Random Forests (RFs) and compared them against
Naive Bayes models. They concluded that SVM and
RF classifiers were equivalent, and that the RF classi-
fier had greater robustness at low false positive (FP)
rates; they both outperformed Naive Bayes models at
low FP rates. [Tseng and Chen, 2009] proposed a com-
plete spam detection system MailNET, which is an in-
cremental SVM model on dynamic e-mail social net-
works. Although SVMs provide high accuracy for spam
filtering, they have been generally associated with high
computational cost and some expensive false positive
errors, hence, few solutions were offered, e.g. Online
SVMs [Sculley and Wachman, 2007], Ensemble of SVMs
[Blanco et al, 2007], etc. A detailed study of various
distance-based kernels and spam filtering behaviors em-
ploying SVM is found in [Amayri and Bouguila, 2010].
5.3 Clustering Techniques
Clustering is the task of grouping a set of patterns into
similar groups. Clustering techniques have been widely
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studied and used in a variety of application domains.
Spam filtering datasets often have true labels available
and clustering algorithms, being unsupervised learning
tools are not always closely related with true labelings.
However given suitable representations, most clustering
algorithms can partion e-mail spam datasets into ham
and spam clusters. This was demonstrated by [Whissell
and Clarke, 2011] in a novel investigation of e-mail spam
clustering. The results were surprisingly significant as
their clustering based approach bettered those of pre-
viously published state-of-the-art semi-supervised ap-
proaches, hence proving that clustering can be a pow-
erful tool for e-mail spam filtering.
Prior to this, Sasaki and Shinnou [Sasaki and Shin-
nou, 2005] had proposed spam detection technique mak-
ing use of the text clustering through a vector space
model. [Basavaraju and Prabhakar, 2010] presented an
effective clustering algorithm integrating K-means and
BIRCH algorithm features. K-means algorithm worked
well for small scale data sets. BIRCH with K-Nearest
Neighbour Classifier (K-NNC) was found to be the ideal
combination as it performed better with large data sets.
[Debarr and Wechsler, 2009] relied on using term fre-
quency and inverse document frequency representation
for e-mails and employed the Partitioning Around Medoids
(PAM) clustering algorithm to cluster a uniform sample
of 25% of messages in the training pool. Clustering com-
bined with Random Forests for classification and active
learning for refinement produced the best Area Under
Curve (AUC) of 95.2%. These works conclude that em-
ploying the ham/spam clusters is a effective method for
spam detection and because a ham/spam split is a nat-
ural clustering for an e-mail spam dataset, clustering
techniques should be investigated further as a tool for
more robust content based spam filters.
5.4 Ensemble Classifiers
Ensemble learning is a novel technique where a set of in-
dividual classifiers are trained and brought together to
enhance the classification accuracy of the overall system
on the same problem (spam detection). An ensemble of
classifiers is very effective for classification tasks and of-
fers good generalization. Spam filters have to deal with
a diversity of spams, so it needs to continually evolve in
order to detect new types of spam (future spam), and
at the same time not allow ‘classical’ spam to evade
the filter. Therefore, [Guerra et al, 2010] had suggested
that combining old and new filters (e.g. using ensem-
ble classifiers) may be an interesting strategy to deal
with the diversity of spams. The most popular ensem-
ble classifiers are bagging and boosting.
Bagging (or bootstrap aggregating) is an ensemble
meta-learning algorithm that is usually applied to deci-
sion tree methods, e.g. Random Forest algorithm is an
ensemble technique for decision trees that is known to
achieve very high classification accuracy. [Biggio et al,
2011] employed bagging ensembles to exploit against
poisoning attacks on spam filters. Random forests have
also been used in the spam detection model described
in [Debarr and Wechsler, 2009] and [Lee et al, 2010b].
Boosting [Biggio et al, 2011] involves algorithms that
build a single strong learner from a set of weak learn-
ers. AdaBoost is the most common implementation of
Boosting. Boosting for filtering of spam messages was
first reported by [Carreras and Marquez, 2001]. [An-
droutsopoulos et al, 2006] compared four most promis-
ing learning algorithms from earlier work - LogitBoost,
Nave Bayes, Flexible Bayes and linear SVM. The au-
thors studied the role of attributes characterizing n-
grams frequencies and explored the effect of attribute
size and training set in a cost-sensitive framework con-
text. Using evaluation measures as in [Androutsopou-
los et al, 2000b], and the PU1 corpus in experiments,
[Carreras and Marquez, 2001] proved the definite effect
of boosting in decision-tree filters. Methods based on
boosting outperformed Naive Bayes and Decision Trees
algorithms when tested on the PU1 corpus. [Sakkis et al,
2001] experimented with combining a memory-based
classifier with a Naive Bayes filter with another memory-
based classifier as president in a stacking framework.
They achieved impressive precision and recall and con-
cluded that stacking consistently raises the performance
of the overall filter. He and Thiesson [He and Thiesson,
2007] proposed a new asymmetric boosting method -
Boosting with Different Costs and applied it to spam fil-
tering. [Neumayer, 2006], [Shi et al, 2012], and [Blanco
et al, 2007] also discuss the application of an ensemble
learning to spam filtering.
6 Evaluation Measures and Benchmarks
Ideally spam filters should be evaluated on large, pub-
licly available spam and ham databases. Sometimes Ac-
curacy (Acc), the ratio of messages correctly classifies
is used as an integrated measure for performance. If NL
and and NS signify the number of legitimate messages
and spam messages to be classified, then we define Ac-
curacy (Acc) and Error (Err) of the spam filter as -
Acc = |L→L|+|S→S|NL+NS and Err = 1 - Acc =
|L→S|+|S→L|
NL+NS
Accuracy and Error consider both False Positive
|L → S| and False Negative |S → L| events to carry
equal cost. However, spam filtering involves asymmetric
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error costs. Failing to identify a ham, i.e. misclassifying
a ham as spam (a False Positive event) is generally a
costlier mistake than missing a spam (a False Negative
event). For e.g. A business letter from the boss or a per-
sonal message from a spouse quarantined (and delayed)
or deleted can lead to serious consequences, while seeing
a spam in our inbox may cause just a slight irritation.
True Positive event |L → L| is when a ham e-mail is
correctly classified as ham. True Negative event |S → S|
is when a spam e-mail is correctly classified as spam.
With this in mind, the False Positive Rate (FPR) - the
proportion of legitimate e-mails identified as spam is
represented as -
FPR = #ofFalsePositives#ofFalsePositives+#ofTrueNegatives
Again, failing to identify spam e.g. e-mails contain-
ing viruses, worms, or phishing baits as payload can
incur significant risks to the user. False Negative Rate
(FNR) i.e. the proportion of spam messages that were
classified as legitimate, is another suitable measure.
FNR = #ofFalseNegatives#ofTruePositives+#ofFalseNegatives
Superior spam classifiers have lower FPR and FNR.
The two-dimensional quantity (FNR, FPR) denotes the
effectiveness of hard classifiers while the effectiveness of
soft classifiers may be denoted by a set of such pairs
defining a curve - an ROC (Receiver Operating Char-
acteristics) curve. ROC analysis are an excellent per-
formance metric in spam filtering. A spam filter whose
ROC curve strictly lies above that of another is the bet-
ter filter in all deployment scenarios. [Cormack, 2008].
Two measures borrowed from Information Retrieval
‘Recall ’ and ‘Precision’ are often used for capturing
the effectiveness and quality of spam filters respectively
[Androutsopoulos et al, 2000a]. If |S → L| signifies the
number of spam messages classified as legitimate, and
|S → S| signifies the number of legtimate messages clas-
sified as spam respectively, and likewise for |L → L|
and |L → S| then Spam Recall (Rs) and Spam Preci-
sion (Ps) are defined by the equations:
Rs =
|S→S|
|S→S|+|S→L| and Ps =
|S→S|
|S→S|+|L→S|
Recall (Rs) is a measure of the number of spam
messages successfully blocked by the filter (i.e. its ef-
fectiveness), while Precision (Ps) measures the number
of the messages classified as spam by the filter that were
indeed spam (i.e. its quality or safety) [Androutsopou-
los et al, 2006] [Sakkis et al, 2001]. Comparing spam
filters based on (Rs) and (Ps) is tricky despite with
each configuration giving (Rs) and (Ps) values.
False positives are considerably more expensive (λ
times) when compared with false negatives [Androut-
sopoulos et al, 2000a] [Androutsopoulos et al, 2006].
Here, λ is a parameter that specifies how ‘dangerous’
or ‘costly’ it is to misclassify legitimate e-mail as spam
and reflects the extra effort it requires from the user
to recover from failures of the filter. For many users
false positives are unacceptable. [Androutsopoulos et al,
2006] suggested this cost sensitivity be taken into ac-
count by treating each legitimate message to be equal
to λ messages. Cost-sensitive measures Weighted Accu-
racy (WAcc), Weighted Error Rate (WErr) and Total
Cost Ratio (TCR) [Clark, 2008] are used as shown in
the formula.
WAcc = λ|L→L|+|S→S|NL+NS and WErr = 1 - WAcc =
λ|L→S|+|S→L|
NL+NS
TCR = NSλ|L→S|+|S→L|
The Total Cost Ratio is used to compare the effec-
tiveness of a filter for a given λ when compared with a
baseline setting [Guzella and Caminhas, 2009]. It is an
evidence of the improvement brought about by the fil-
ter. This cost-sensitive evaluation uses the λ parameter
to adjust the weight of a false positive. There are three
values for λ used commonly in spam literature, λ = 1,
9, 999 [Androutsopoulos et al, 2000b], [Androutsopou-
los et al, 2000a], [Androutsopoulos et al, 2006], [Sakkis
et al, 2001] and [Clark, 2008]. These values represent the
situations when a false positive equals a false negative,
or a false positive is 9 times a costlier mistake than a
false negative, or 999 times costlier. Greater TCR values
indicate superior performance. F-measure or F-score is
another combining measure that combines both Preci-
sion (Ps) and Recall (Rs) metrics in one equation. It
can be interpreted as the weighted harmonic mean of
both.
F −measure = 2.Precision.RecallPrecision+Recall
6.1 Publicly Available Benchmark Datasets
Most of the datasets publicly available are static datasets
with very few concept drift datasets. Many authors con-
struct their own image spam or phishing corpus. Table
4 below lists public corpora with associated information
used in spam filtering experiments.
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Table 4 Publicly available benchmark datasets on E-mail Spam.
Corpus Name
Number of Messages/Images
Spam Rate Year of Creation Reference/Used
Spam Ham
SpamAssassin 1897 4150 31% 2002 [Me´ndez et al, 2006]
Enron-Spam 13,496 16,545 - 2006 [Koprinska et al, 2007]
LingSpam 481 2412 17% 2000 [Sakkis et al, 2001]
PU1 481 618 44% 2000 [Attar et al, 2011]
PU2 142 579 20% 2003 [Zhang et al, 2004]
PU3 1826 2313 44% 2003 [Zhang et al, 2004]
PUA 571 571 50% 2003 [Zhang et al, 2004]
Gen Spam 41,404 78% 2005 [Cormack and Lynam, 2007]
Spambase 1813 2788 39% 1999 [Sakkis et al, 2001]
ZH1 1205 428 74% 2004 [Zhang et al, 2004]
TREC 2005 52,790 39,399 - 2005 [Androutsopoulos et al, 2000a]
TREC 2006 24,912 12,910 - 2006 [Androutsopoulos et al, 2000c]
TREC 2007 50,199 25,220 - 2007 [Debarr and Wechsler, 2009]
Spam Archive >2,20,000 100% 1998 [Almeida and Yamakami, 2012]
Biggio 8549 0 - 2005 [Biggio et al, 2006]
Princeton Spam Image
Benchmark
1071 0 - - [Biggio et al, 2006]
SpamArchive >2,20,000 100% 1998 [Almeida and Yamakami, 2012]
Dredze Image Spam
Dataset
3927 2006 - 2007 [Almeida and Yamakami, 2012]
Phishing Corpus 415 0 - 2005 [Abu-nimeh et al, 2007]
7 Future Challenges and Conclusion
Spam filtering is an ‘arms race’ marked by an increase
in the sophistication in spam construction techniques
as well as spam filtering techniques [Goodman et al,
2007]. Characterization and measurement studies have
been developed in content-based spam filtering [Pu and
Webb, 2006], [Blanzieri and Bryl, 2008]. The evolution
of the infrastructure used by spammers to disseminate
spams over the network is seen in their migration from
simple obfuscation techniques, to image spam and to
compromised machines. The dynamic nature of spam
and the reactivity of spammers make e-mail spam fil-
tering an active research area. E-mail spam filtering will
remain a persistent problem and some of the most inter-
esting challenges in the future of e-mail spam filtering
could be -
7.1 Handling Concept Drift
In the actual world, concepts change over time in unan-
ticipated ways and are therfore hard to predict. Changes
in the statistical properties of context can lead to a
change in the target variable or concept. Concept drift
is distinguished in literature as ‘sudden’ and ‘gradual’
[Tsymbal et al, 2008]. For e.g., a student graduating
from college might all of a sudden develop financial con-
cerns, whereas, in a biomedical context, pathogen sen-
sitivity may gradually evolve with the passage of time
as bacterial pathogens develop immunity to antibiotics
that used to be effective earlier. Hidden changes in con-
text affects not just the target concept but also causes
an alteration in the underlying data distributions [De-
lany et al, 2005], making the learning task increasingly
complicated and requiring special approaches. Models
built on old data become less accurate or inconsistent
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making the rebuilding of the model imperative (called
virtual concept drift). Spam filtering is a dynamic prob-
lem that involves concept drift. While the understand-
ing of an unwanted message may remain the same, the
statistical properties of the spam e-mail changes over
time since it is driven by spammers involved in a never-
ending arms race with spam filters. Another reason for
concept drift could be the different products or scams
driven by spam that tend to become popular. The dy-
namic nature of spam is one of its most testing aspects.
An effective spam filter must be able to track target
concept drift and swiftly adapt to it. Research on con-
cept drift confirms lazy learning techniques to be the
most effective models against concept drift [Tsymbal,
2004], [Tsymbal et al, 2008]. Most of the earlier evalua-
tions did not try to deal with concept drift, or with real-
world datasets that have some concept drift. Few au-
thors tried to address concept drift in spam filtering us-
ing Case-Base Reasoning [Delany et al, 2005], Instance-
Based Reasoning [Fdez-Riverola et al, 2007b], Ensem-
ble Learning [Tsymbal et al, 2008], Language Model
technique [Hayat et al, 2010]. A particular challenge in
handling concept drift is in distinguishing between true
concept drift and noise. Research in concept drift is a
very active area in spam filtering.
7.2 Eliminating False Positives
Spam filtering is often viewed as a straight text catego-
rization problem. But e-mail is not just text, it also
has structure, hence in reality it turns out to be a
more complicated problem than straightforward classi-
fication. One complication arises from the cost-sensitivity
associated with the spam filtering problem. The cost of
inadvertently restricting a ham message is more than
that of a spam message evading the filter (see section 6).
Such mislabeling of e-mail is completely unacceptable
to users as it can lead to loss of important information
or even more serious consequences. Moreover, in this
case the user has to review the messages sorted out
to the spam folder and it somehow defeats the whole
purpose of spam filtering [Tretyakov, 2004]. Content-
based spam filtering systems, though widely adopted as
a successful spam defense strategy, has unfortunately
substituted the spam issue with a false positive one.
Such systems achieve a high accuracy but there exists
some false positive tradeoff. False positives are more
severe and expensive than spam. Although significant
attempts e.g. Reliable e-mail [Garriss et al, 2006] have
been made, nevertheless, to make e-mail reliable, spam
filters must reduce the incidences of false positives. Re-
duction of false positives is another domain in e-mail
spam analysis where much work needs to be been done
on leveraging existing algorithms.
7.3 Emerging Spam Threats
One of the biggest spam problems today even as spam
e-mail volumes associated with botnets are receding
is the snowshoe spam. Showshoe spamming is a tech-
nique that uses multiple IP addresses, websites and
sub-networks to send spam, so as to avoid detection
by spam filters. The term ‘snowshoe’ spam describes
how some spammers distribute their load across a larger
surface to keep from sinking, just as snowshoe wear-
ers do [McAfee, 2012] [Sophos, 2013]. Social networks
have also become a hunting ground for spammers. With
many users migrating to social networks as a means of
communication, spammers are diversifying in order to
stay in business. The personal information revealed in
social networks is gleaned by spammers to target un-
suspecting victims with tailored e-mails.
7.4 Prioritising E-mails
E-mail prioritization is an urgent research area with not
much research done. In addition to basic communica-
tion, our e-mails are ‘overloaded’ in the sense of being
used for a wide variety of other tasks - communica-
tion, advertisements, reminders, contact management,
task management, and cloud storage. There is a seri-
ous need to address the information overload issue by
developing systems that can learn personal priorities
from data and identify important e-mails for each user.
Prioritizing e-mail as per its importance is another de-
sirable characteristic in a spam filter. Prioritizing e-mail
or perhaps redirecting urgent messages to handheld de-
vices could be another way of managing e-mails [Ko-
prinska et al, 2007]. Learning to prioritize or rank is
a relatively new field in which Machine Learning algo-
rithms are used to learn some ranking function. [Dredze
et al, 2009] and [Aberdeen and Slater, 2011] are signif-
icant works on ranking algorithms for proposing useful
filters that rapidly filter groups of inbox messages and
search messages more easily. However importance rank-
ing is harder than it seems as often users disagree on
what is important, requiring a high degree of person-
alization. The result is the growth of one of the most
challenging research areas in Machine Learning i.e. Per-
sonalized e-mail prioritization [Yang et al, 2010], which
rely mostly on the analysis of social networks to model
user priorities among incoming e-mail messages.
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8 Conclusion
Future researches must address the fact that e-mail
spam filtering is a co-evolutionary problem, since as
the filter attempts to extend its predictive accuracy,
the spammers attempt to outdo the classifiers. Hence,
an effective approach should find a successful mecha-
nism to identify the drift or evolution in spam features.
Among all the traditional approaches discussed so far,
the single approach that has achieved tremendous suc-
cess against spam is content-based spam filtering. For-
tunately, machine learning-based systems enable sys-
tems to learn and adapt to new threats, reacting to
counteractive measures adopted by spammers.
No single anti-spam solution may be the right an-
swer. A multi-faceted approach that combines legal and
technical solutions and more is likely to provide a death
blow to such spam. Without an effective solution spam
will only continue to decrease the value of an efficient
communication medium. As long as spam exists it will
continue to have adverse effects on the preservation of
integrity of e-mails and the user’s perception on the ef-
fectiveness of spam filters. We reviewed content-based
spam filtering techniques based on Machine Learning
methods propounded so far, highlighting the main ap-
proaches and advancements gained by the approach. A
quantitative analysis of the major reviews over the last
decade was conducted. Overall the number and qual-
ity of literature demonstrates that remarkable advance-
ments have been achieved and continue to be achieved.
However some outstanding problems in e-mail spam
filtering as highlighted above still remain. Till more
improvements in spam filtering happen, anti-spam re-
search will remain an active research area.
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